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ABSTRACT
Background: Canadian oncology decision-makers have reimbursed
cancer drugs at incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICER) higher than
those considered acceptable in other therapeutic areas. Sunitinib is a
multitargeted receptor tyrosine kinase inhibitor, indicated for metastatic
renal-cell carcinoma (MRCC) of clear cell histology. Canadian decision-
makers evaluated sunitinib funding in the presence of important data
limitations (including interim analysis of a surrogate outcome) and in the
context of a high ICER.
Methods: First, a description was presented of the cost-effectiveness
analysis submitted for sunitinib reimbursement decision-making in
Canada before conclusive survival evidence had been available. Second,
sunitinib access decisions and the oncology drug reimbursement literature
were reviewed to explore the interpretation of sunitinib perceived value in
the context of the decision-making framework in Canada.
Results: The economic evaluation yielded an ICER of $144K/quality-
adjusted life-year gained for sunitinib compared with interferon-alfa. This
high ratio was not an insurmountable barrier to access in Canada because
all provinces now reimburse sunitinib for ﬁrst-line treatment of MRCC. In
this particular instance, payers were receptive to immature survival data
but substantial progression-free gains, for patients with a relatively rare
cancer and few treatment options.
Conclusion: This demonstrates that the cost-effectiveness ratio is only one
of many factors that affect an access decision in oncology.
Keywords: access, cost-effectiveness ratio, decision-making, economic,
kidney cancer, oncology, reimbursement, renal cell carcinoma, sunitinib.
Introduction
As a result of ongoing concerns about the sustainability of health
care, attention has focused on rational funding choices. Eco-
nomic evaluations are a useful tool for improving resource allo-
cation efﬁciency; they have been a national requirement for
reimbursement in Canada for oral oncology drugs since 1996,
and for infusional oncology drugs since 2007. Nevertheless, the
role of economic evidence in reimbursement decision-making
remains unclear. Some detractors ﬁnd it unhelpful, some support-
ers use it with exclusive reference to an explicit or implicit
cost-effectiveness threshold, and still others ﬁnd it helpful only in
a broader context which incorporates both evidence and nonevi-
dentiary factors [1]. Against this background, high-cost oncology
drugs pose unique challenges to decision-makers. This article
presents the case of sunitinib malate for metastatic renal-cell
cancer (MRCC), which exempliﬁes the common challenges of
clinical uncertainty and a high cost-effectiveness ratio.
Kidney cancer is an uncommon disease; there were approxi-
mately 4400 new cases of kidney cancer diagnosed in Canada in
2008, with 1600 deaths [2]. Renal cell carcinoma (RCC)
accounts for 80% to 85% of all kidney cancers and is the most
aggressive type of urologic cancer [3,4]. About 25% of patients
present with metastases at diagnosis and overall, about half of
patients will eventually have advanced disease requiring systemic
therapy [5,6]. Historically, prognosis of patients with MRCC
was extremely poor with a median overall survival (OS) from
time of metastasis of 6–12 months [4,7]. Hormonal, chemothera-
peutic, and radiation therapy approaches have failed to signiﬁ-
cantly improve clinical outcomes for patients with MRCC [6,7].
Before the targeted therapy era, cytokine immunotherapy involv-
ing interferon-alfa (IFN-a) or interleukin-2 (IL-2), used to be the
mainstay of MRCC treatment—despite an overall probability of
partial or complete remission of only 12.4% [8]. Even at that
time, cytokines were considered not suitable for more than 80%
of patients with MRCC and alternative therapeutic options for
those patients were universally dismal [9].
Sunitinib malate (SUTENT), a multitargeted receptor
tyrosine kinase inhibitor, was investigated in two single-arm,
multicenter, phase 2 trials in patients with MRCC who had failed
initial cytokine immunotherapy [10,11]. In August 2006, on the
basis of these trials, sunitinib was granted conditional approval
in Canada for the treatment of MRCC of clear-cell histology
after failure of cytokine-based therapy or in patients who are
considered likely to be intolerant of such therapy [12]. In April
2007, Canada’s central reimbursement review agency, the
Common Drug Review (CDR), provided a “do not reimburse”
recommendation for second-line use of sunitinib in MRCC,
based on two issues: lack of randomized controlled trial data
supporting the use of sunitinib in patients who have failed
cytokine-based therapy, and the resulting uncertainty in both the
survival beneﬁt and the cost-effectiveness of sunitinib in this
patient population [13].
While the second-line MRCC reimbursement submission was
being reviewed by CDR, interim results from a phase 3 pivotal
randomized controlled trial (Protocol A6181034, thereafter
referred to as trial 1034) in previously untreated MRCC
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patients were published by Motzer et al. [14]. These results
showed statistically superior clinical beneﬁts for sunitinib com-
pared to IFN-a with respect to progression-free survival (11
months vs. 5 months), objective response rate (31% vs. 6%), and
quality of life (P < 0.001). Sunitinib was also associated with
acceptable and manageable toxicity. At time of the interim analy-
sis, median OS had not been reached but there was a trend
toward an improved OS with sunitinib. This publication fulﬁlled
the need for randomized controlled trial data for sunitinib in
MRCC. Based on the results of that trial [14], Health Canada
revised the label of sunitinib in MRCC; the approved indication
is now “for the treatment of MRCC of clear cell histology” with
no further speciﬁcation [15].
Moreover, an economic evaluation based on this trial was
developed and submitted for centralized reimbursement review
to the Joint Oncology Drug Review (JODR), which formally
replaced CDR as an interim national review process for oncology
drugs in March 2007. This evaluation compared sunitinib and
IFN-a in treatment-naive patients with MRCC from a public
health-care system perspective. After examining these data, the
JODR committee concluded that ﬁrst-line therapy with sunitinib
appeared to be more effective and better tolerated than IFN-
a—but was not cost-effective [16].
Today, all provincial cancer funding agencies in Canada
reimburse sunitinib for ﬁrst-line therapy of MRCC and several
provinces also fund it for second-line treatment of MRCC after
failure of IFN-a [17]. By consensus statement and therapeutic
guidelines, sunitinib has become the ﬁrst-line standard of care for
most patients with MRCC in Canada [18]. Provincial funding
has been made available to support evidence-based practice in
MRCC.
The goal of this article is twofold: ﬁrst, to review the eco-
nomic evaluation of sunitinib for ﬁrst-line treatment of MRCC
that was available to decision-makers at the time of the funding
decision; and second, to explore the interpretation and inﬂuence
of these results in the context of the reimbursement decision-
making framework in Canada.
Economic Methods
Clinical Setting
The target population for the model reﬂected the study popula-
tion in the pivotal trial of sunitinib versus IFN-a in MRCC:
adults with conﬁrmed MRCC of clear cell histology, who had not
received previous systemic (including adjuvant or neoadjuvant)
therapy for RCC (i.e., immunotherapy, chemotherapy, hormonal,
or investigational therapy) [14]. Typical patients were Causasian
(92%) males (71%), with a mean age of 60 years, an Eastern
Cooperative Oncology Group (ECOG) performance status of 0
(61%) or 1 (39%), previous nephrectomy (90%), metastases to
the lung (78%) and lymph nodes (56%), and favorable (36%) or
intermediate (56%) prognostic risk factors, based on the Memo-
rial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center criteria [14].
In Canada, IL-2 is used in only a few specialized centers,
generally strictly under an investigative protocol. As a result,
IFN-a has become the ﬁrst choice active therapy in MRCC
because of the lack of more effective or less toxic alternatives [7]
Therefore, the appropriate comparator for ﬁrst-line MRCC
treatment was IFN-a.
To model a lifetime-horizon patient experience, it was neces-
sary to follow patient care after failure of ﬁrst-line therapy.
Historically, there had been very few second-line treatment
options, and none with a favorable response/toxicity ratio; most
of these patients were encouraged to enroll into clinical trials
[19,20]. When this analysis was performed, sunitinib and sor-
afenib were both approved but not reimbursed by public drug
programs in Canada for use after failure of cytokine therapy
[12,21]. Also, there were no data supporting the use of sorafenib
after failure of sunitinib. Neither sorafenib nor sunitinib was
included in the economic model as a second-line treatment
option, on the basis that they were not part of the publicly
funded clinical practice. Their noninclusion also prevented a
contamination of the results for the ﬁrst-line comparison. Indeed,
to isolate the incremental effect of sunitinib versus IFN-a for
ﬁrst-line use, it is necessary to exclude subsequent use of any
tyrosine kinase inhibitor. This is standard practice in an eco-
nomic model, although it may not mimic current clinical reality
[22]. Second-line therapies considered in this model include
IFN-a, high-dose IL-2, clinical trial enrollment, or best support-
ive care. Proportions of use after progression on ﬁrst-line therapy
with sunitinib or IFN-a were determined by a survey of ﬁve
Canadian clinical experts.
Economic Model Description
A Markov model was developed to simulate costs and outcomes
over the lifetime of the modeled patient population. All patients
were assumed to enter the model on sunitinib or IFN-a. Over
time, patients moved between the following six health states:
progression-free survival on sunitinib or IFN-a, progression and
transition to active second-line treatment followed by best sup-
portive care (BSC) or transition directly to BSC without going
through a second-line active treatment, death due to cancer,
or death because of other causes (Fig. 1). The Markov model
used six-week cycles, corresponding to the dosing schedule for
sunitinib.
Each health state was associated with a speciﬁc cost, based on
resource utilization typical for care in that health state, as well as
a speciﬁc utility value, representing quality of life. Patients on
different treatments moved through the health states at different
rates; in this way, treatments could be compared based on the
costs and consequences which accrued over time. The model
generated the cost per life year gained and cost per quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) gained—the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER) and the incremental cost-utility ratio
(ICUR), respectively.
Data sources: consequences. Transitional probabilities are the
rates at which patients move between health states (Table 1).
Transitional probabilities for disease progression on ﬁrst-line
therapy were determined using the patient-level time to progres-
sion data from the third data cutoff date of trial 1034 (February
2007) [23]. Weibull curves were ﬁtted to the Kaplan–Meier pro-
gression probability estimates to extrapolate past the window of
clinical trial observation. Extrapolation was minimal because
progression had occurred in almost 90% of patients at the time
of the third interim analysis; correlation coefﬁcients between the
Weibull and the Kaplan–Meier survival curves were -0.9937 and
-0.9816 for the sunitinib and IFN-a curves, respectively. At
progression, patients switched to a second-line active regimen or
directly to BSC. Average time to disease progression on second-
line therapy was determined from a review of various second-line
therapies, where median progression-free survival (PFS) was esti-
mated at 2.9 months [24]. Patients who progressed while on
active second-line therapy transitioned from active treatment to
BSC. All second-line treatment modalities were assumed to have
the same effectiveness. The cost, however, varied by treatment.
Transition probabilities for death were derived from different
sources. Death from other causes was determined from Canadian
life tables [25]. Ideally, death from renal cell cancer would be
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based on long-term follow-up and survival analysis from the
phase 3 trial (1034). However, survival data were immature at
time of this analysis. Moreover, ﬁnal OS beneﬁt were expected to
be confounded by crossover or by the next line of therapies
received outside trial 1034. The same problem has been identiﬁed
with sorafenib [26] and is typical in oncology [27].
Instead, the risk of death from cancer for patients receiving
sunitinib was extrapolated from the updated pooled analysis of
the two trials of sunitinib for second-line MRCC showing a
median OS of 19.9 months [28]. It was conservative to assume
that patients receiving sunitinib ﬁrst-line had the same risk of
death from renal cancer as patients receiving sunitinib second-
line. The risk of death for patients receiving IFN-a was based on
systematic reviews of active second-line therapies (median OS,
12.7 months) [24]. This result was similar to a systematic review
of immunotherapy in MRCC (13 months) [8]. The resulting
PFS on 1st line 
active therapy 
PFS on 2nd-line active
Death: cancer-
related
Death: other 
causes 
Survival on BSC only 
Figure 1 Economic model.
Table 1 Model inputs, consequences
Transitional probabilities 6-week transition probability Source
Probability of death due to other causes
All patients 0.001223 [25]
Cancer-related death probability*
First-line therapy—sunitinib 0.047084 [28]
First-line therapy—IFN-a 0.072785 [24]
Second-line active therapy followed by BSC 0.072785 [24]
BSC only 0.118634 [8]
Progression probability†
First-line therapy—sunitinib Weibull distribution Patient-level data from trial 1034 [23]
l = 0.005506
g = 1.24479
First-line therapy—IFN-a Weibull distribution Patient-level data from trial 1034 [23]
l = 0.040879
g = 0.913162
Second-line active therapy (any treatment) 0.281756 [24]
Utility by health state
First-line therapy—sunitinib ON therapy 0.72125 Protocol 1034; Clinical Study Report [30]
First-line therapy—sunitinib OFF therapy 0.75987 Protocol 1034; Clinical Study Report [30]
First-line therapy—IFN-a 0.71530 Protocol 1034; Clinical Study Report [30]
Second-line active therapy (any treatment) 0.63090 Protocol 014; Data on ﬁle [31]
BSC 0.55090 Protocol 014; Data on ﬁle [31]
Death 0
*Corrected for the risk of death from other causes.
†The probability density function of a Weibull distribution is: f (t) = lgtg-1exp(-ltg ).
BSC, best supportive care.
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difference in median OS (7.2 months) corresponded closely to the
difference in median PFS (7.0 months) reported by Motzer et al.
(based on the analysis using investigators’ assessment of
response) [29]. Survival on active second-line treatment was also
assumed to be 12.7 months based on the literature [24], whereas
median OS for BSC was observed to be 7.6 months [8]. In all
cases, median OS was converted to a per-cycle probability of
death using an exponential distribution and assuming a constant
cycle probability.
Utility associated with each health state was derived from the
sunitinib ﬁrst- [30] and second-line trials [31] (Table 1). These
trials administered the EQ-5D, an instrument which generates
quality of life results in the form of a utility score. Utility scores
rate quality of life on a cardinal scale from 0 to 1, with 0
representing death and 1 representing perfect health. Utility
scores were directly applied to estimate quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs).
Data sources: costs. The economic model included drug treat-
ment acquisition cost, cost of routine follow-up for patients
receiving active treatment, cost of treatment for severe/signiﬁcant
adverse events, costs associated with ﬁrst disease progression,
cost of routine health-care resources involved in BSC, and cost of
death. Costs were reported in 2007 Canadian dollars (where
necessary, adjusted using the Health and Personal Care compo-
nent of the Consumer Price Index) [32]. (For March 2010: $1
CDN = $0.98 US = £0.65).
Drug acquisition costs were determined from public formu-
laries (Table 2) [33,34]; dosing and dose reductions were based
on observations from trial 1034 [30]. Sunitinib was administered
as 50 mg daily for 4 weeks, followed by 2 weeks off treatment.
Dose reduction to 37.5 mg daily for adverse events occurred in
8.5% of cycles administered. IFN-a was administered three times
weekly as a subcutaneous injection: 3 MU per dose in Week 1,
6 MU per dose in Week 2, then 9 MU per dose thereafter. Dose
reduction to 6 MU for adverse events was applied to 9.7% of
cycles administered.
Second-line therapy was assigned by Canadian clinical expert
opinion (n = 5; Table 2); patients who received sunitinib ﬁrst-line
preserved IFN-a as a potential second-line treatment, whereas
those receiving IFN-a ﬁrst-line had fewer options. As discussed
previously, crossover to second-line tyrosine kinase inhibitors for
cytokine failures was prohibited in the model.
Routine care while on active therapy was determined by
expert opinion and included ongoing physician visits, blood
work, CT scans, and bone scans for those with bone metastases
(approximately 30% of patients). Sunitinib patients required
additional tests: TSH, T3, amylase, and lipase. Physician visits
and laboratory tests were priced using schedules of beneﬁts from
the province of Ontario [35,36]. Ambulatory services were
priced using a province of Alberta cost manual [37] Patients
receiving IL-2 received treatment while in hospital; the hospital
admission cost was not included. Those on investigational thera-
pies received routine care at no cost, assuming these costs are
usually funded through the research budget.
Adverse event costs were assessed by expert opinion for
Grades 3 and 4 adverse events which differed by treatment and
were clinically relevant (Table 2). A weighted mean cost per
treatment was determined byweighting the costs for each event by
the frequency of its occurrence, and summing by treatment group.
Costs for disease progression on ﬁrst-line therapy, BSC, death
from cancer, and death from other causes were based on a
Table 2 Model inputs, costs
Resource Cost (2007 $CDN) Source
Drug acquisition
First-line sunitinib 6-week cycle @ 50 mg/day $6,947.99 [33]
First-line sunitinib 6-week cycle @ 37.5 mg/day $5,210.99 [33]
First-line IFN-a 6-week cycle (cycle 1) $1,529.99 [33]
First-line IFN-a 6-week cycle (cycle 2+) $1,835.46 [33]
First-line IFN-a 6-week cycle (reduced dose) $1,223.64 [33]
Interleukin-2 $14,919.26 [34]
Investigational treatments $0 Assumption
Second-line treatments
After ﬁrst-line sunitinib failure 15% IFN-a Clinical expert opinion
3% high dose IL-2
27% investigational
55% BSC
After ﬁrst-line IFN-a failure 1% high dose IL-2 Clinical expert opinion
19% investigational
80% BSC
Adverse events
First-line sunitinib (15.8% of patients/cycle) $291.36 Clinical expert opinion
Fee schedules [35,37,61]
First-line IFN-a (7.3% of patients/cycle) $189.32 Clinical expert opinion
Fee schedules [35,37,61]
Routine care
First-line sunitinib (per 6-week cycle) $1,014.77 Clinical expert opinion
Fee schedules [35–37]
First-line IFN-a (per 6-week cycle) $986.33 Clinical expert opinion
Fee schedules [35–37]
Second-line interleukin-2 $986.33 Clinical expert opinion
Fee schedules [35–37]
Subsequent care
Disease progression (during ﬁrst-line treatment) $7,002.13 [38]
Best Supportive Care (per cycle) $1,127.63 [38]
Cancer death* $19,388.16 [38]
Death from other causes $6,080.91 [38]
*Cancer death included a three-month terminal care phase; this required a commensurate three-month correction in BSC costs, for patients with cancer deaths.
BSC, best supportive care; IFN-a, interferon alfa.
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recently published Canadian economic evaluation in breast
cancer, on the assumption that these patient care costs would be
similar irrespective of the type of cancer (Table 2) [38].
Model Parameters
The perspective of the evaluation was that of a public health-care
system. Costs and outcomes were discounted at a rate of 5%, as
per Canadian guidelines [39]. The time horizon was lifetime; in
practical terms it was 10 years, but the model predicts that 95%
of patients will be dead by the end of 4 years.
Sensitivity Analyses
Parameter uncertainty was handled using both probabilistic and
deterministic sensitivity analyses. Probabilistic analysis varied all
inputs simultaneously, according to a theoretical probability dis-
tribution assigned to each input. This generated a 95% conﬁ-
dence interval for the ICER and ICUR. Deterministic sensitivity
analyses varied one input at a time, to assess the relative impor-
tance of each input to the overall results. Consequence inputs
(transitional probabilities, utility scores, adverse event rates)
were varied 10–20%, whereas cost inputs were generally
varied 50%. The proportion of patients receiving active
second-line therapy was varied between 10% and 70% in the
sunitinib group and between 0% and 40% for IFN-a. The dis-
count rate was varied to 0% and 3% according to Canadian
guidelines [39]. Finally, a shorter 5-year time horizon was also
examined.
Results
Total lifetime costs per patient in the sunitinib arm were esti-
mated to be $107K versus $45K in the IFN-a arm—a difference
of $62K (Table 3). Figure 2 presents the breakdown of costs by
category. For sunitinib, the majority of cost was because of
ﬁrst-line drug treatment, followed by terminal care costs associ-
ated with a cancer death. The reverse was found for IFN-a
patients—ﬁrst-line drug costs were exceeded by terminal care
costs. In both cases, BSC was also a substantial cost.
Treatment with sunitinib was associated with overall survival
of 2.17 years, of which 1.11 years were progression-free
(Table 3). By comparison, treatment with IFN-a was associated
with a mean overall survival of 1.57 years, of which 0.64 year
was progression-free. There was an incremental difference of
0.47 year (5.6 months) in PFS, and 0.60 year (7.2 months) in OS,
for sunitinib patients. OS increment was slightly longer than PFS
because sunitinib patients preserved cytokine therapy for second-
line use and thus had more active therapy options.
QALY gains were smaller than life-year gains, because sur-
vival with metastatic cancer involved a reduced quality of life; the
incremental difference in QALY was 0.43 QALY (5.2 months) in
favor of sunitinib. The ICER of sunitinib versus IFN-a was
$105K per life-year gained (LYG); the ICUR was $144K per
QALY gained (Table 3).
Univariate sensitivity analyses examined the impact of
changes to the consequence inputs, the cost inputs, and the model
parameters (Fig. 3). For consequences, the most important inputs
were the percentages of patients assigned to different second-line
therapies, subsequent to the failure of either sunitinib or IFN-a.
Also important were the utility values that were assigned to each
health state. For costs, the drug costs had the most impact to the
model; other costs (e.g., routine care, adverse events, cost of
cancer death, etc.) had minimal impact. For the model param-
eters, changes to the discount rate had minimal impact, because
costs were incurred early and many patients did not survive past
2 years. Restricting the horizon to 5 years with 95% mortality
Table 3 Incremental cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses
Treatment strategy Total cost ($) Progression-free years Life years QALYs ICER (D$/DLYS) ICUR (D$/DQALY)
Sunitinib 106,889 1.11 2.17 1.41 104,831 144,232
IFN-a 44,623 0.64 1.57 0.98
ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; ICUR, incremental cost-utility ratio; IFN-a, interferon alfa; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
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Figure 2 Cost distribution by treatment.
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(instead of 10 years, with 100% mortality) increased the ICUR
slightly to $150K, because some of the extended survival of
sunitinib patients were truncated from the shorter time horizon.
Probabilistic sensitivity analyses generated 90% credibility
intervals of $89K–$133K per LYG, and $102K–$267K per
QALY gained. The broader range for the ICUR was because of
uncertainty in the utility values assigned to each health state.
Discussion
This economic evaluation indicated that the use of sunitinib in
treatment-naïve MRCC patients could result in an increase in
survival of 7.2 months, at an incremental cost of $62K: $105K
per LYG and $144K per QALY gained. Although sunitinib
appeared more effective and better tolerated than IFN-a in ﬁrst-
line treatment of MRCC, it was not considered cost-effective by
the recommendation-making panel for the JODR [16].
The trial-based ﬁnal median PFS increment was 5.9 months
for sunitinib patients (based on the analysis the economic model
predicted a mean 5.6 months). The ﬁnal median OS data from
trial 1034 was 26.4 months for sunitinib patients—exactly as
predicted by the economic model. The median incremental sur-
vival beneﬁt for those who received their per-protocol therapy
exclusively was 14.0 months—twice that predicted by the model
[40]. These data justiﬁed the early conﬁdence in sunitinib clinical
beneﬁt based on PFS. The problem of contamination by subse-
quent lines of therapies was well illustrated by the reduction of
the survival gain to 4.6 months, when including patients who
crossed over to sunitinib and those who received poststudy treat-
ments [40]. With a survival increment of 14 months, the ICUR
for sunitinib versus IFN-a would have been around $75K per
QALY, which is in the range of ICURs commonly accepted for
oncology medicines in Canada. The analysis submitted to JODR
and presented previously clearly underestimated the survival
beneﬁt provided by sunitinib. Because economic evidence is gen-
erally developed by the manufacturers, payers often perceive the
analyses as being biased in favor of the product submitted. This
was apparently not the case here.
Recently, a US economic evaluation comparing sunitinib with
IFN-a based on patient-level clinical data derived from trial 1034
reported an ICER of $67K per LYG and an ICUR of $53K per
QALY gained [41]. The difference in results could be because of
a different approach in modeling OS but most likely is because of
the inclusion of tyrosine kinase inhibitors as second-line options
in the US model. This had the effect of signiﬁcantly increasing
costs and beneﬁts in the IFN-a arm, with a projected survival
advantage of only 1.3 months for sunitinib at an incremental cost
of $7534. The results of the current analysis are nevertheless
somewhat consistent with the US model in predicting survival for
sunitinib; the US model projected a mean survival of 25.1 months
in the sunitinib arm [41] compared with 26.4 months in the
current Canadian analysis.
At the time of market approval, payers have to make access
decisions, despite incomplete data and uncertainty. Clinical
uncertainty leads directly to economic uncertainty. In fact, the
primary limitation of this economic analysis was immature sur-
vival data, with its resulting difﬁculty in accurately estimating the
cost-effectiveness ratio. In drug reimbursement decision-making,
profound data limitations are not uncommon for innovative
drugs. Registration trials are not designed to inform reimburse-
ment decisions; the limitations of these trials, for example the use
of surrogate outcomes, were identiﬁed as the primary problem
faced by CDR committee members [42]. Health economists have
developed methods to address this, using probabilistic sensitivity
analysis and value of information analysis [43]. Nevertheless, for
those who make access decisions, mathematical techniques are
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no substitute for trial evidence gaps. This evidence gap is par-
ticularly profound in oncology, where clinical practice can
change rapidly based on conference abstract data. Early termi-
nation of trials based on promising interim analyses, the avail-
ability of surrogate endpoints only, crossover contamination,
accelerated approval, and adoption plus ethical considerations
make it nearly impossible ever to “answer the question” of
survival beneﬁt [27]. A certain level of clinical and eco-
nomic uncertainty is unavoidable and must be understood and
accepted when reviewing new drugs with a goal of timeliness in
decision-making.
Oncology represents a particularly complicated environment.
In Canada, almost all oncology drugs are purchased and admin-
istered through the public health-care system, highlighting the
importance of public plan access decisions. In all countries,
expensive drugs are beyond the pocketbooks of most patients,
meaning a negative recommendation is a denial of access. These
decisions are very hard for patients and physicians to accept, and
for committees to make [1,44]. As a result, decision-makers
“[engage] not only the minds but profoundly [call] on the often
conﬂicting values of the heart [45].” Surveys in Canada and the
United States have found that oncologists are not supportive of
access restrictions. A majority believe that patients should have
access to the drugs which they believe offer beneﬁt, irrespective of
cost [46,47]. In Canada, there have been campaigns to galvanize
public opinion in support of novel anticancer drugs, with the
result that media, advocacy, and political intervention have suc-
cessfully circumvented evidence-based review processes [48].
As a means to reconcile these conﬂicts, it is increasingly
suggested that reimbursement decisions should include a consid-
eration of both the evidence (clinical efﬁcacy, economic value,
and budget impact) and the values that inform our societies.
Current processes in Canada are not well designed to incorporate
the societal values, resulting in unclear guidance for decision-
makers and a feeling of lack of inclusiveness among stakeholders
[49]. Oncology reimbursement decision-makers have called for a
revision of the review process to improve decision-making, such
as: transparency of processes and decisions, broader representa-
tion of expertise on review panels, greater use of ethics to resolve
conﬂicts arising from different perspectives, and formal guidance
for weighting both evidence and values [1]. These suggestions
may create a process which is built to resolve clinical, economic,
and ethical dilemmas.
The economic challenge with sunitinib was the relatively high
ICER compared to those commonly seen for chemotoxic chemo-
therapies. Decision-makers struggle with high ICERs; solutions
are informal, undocumented, and idiosyncratic. In fact, whereas
the role of economic evaluations in reimbursement decision-
making is ﬁrmly entrenched in many countries, it has not been
well studied [50]. The UK’s National Institute for Clinical Excel-
lence (NICE) has had more public scrutiny than any other central
review agency. NICE has stated an effective ICER threshold of
$45K (2005 US$) [51]. For ICERs above UK£20K, decisions are
more likely to include “the range of uncertainty surrounding the
calculation, the innovative nature of the technology, the particu-
lar features of the condition and population receiving the tech-
nology, and where appropriate the wider societal costs and
beneﬁt . . . above UK£30K, the case . . . has to be exceedingly
strong” [52]. NICE historically had a track record of approving
more oncology medications at the upper bound of acceptability
than non–oncology medications; however, more recently there
has been a rejection of multiple drugs for advanced cancer [53].
In January 2009, NICE adopted new guidance for end-of life
drug appraisal. In this guidance, NICE proposed new criteria to
increase ﬂexibility of its technology appraisal process and enable
access to drugs for terminal illnesses with an ICER in excess of
the UK£30K upper range limit provided that the illness affects a
small number of patient and the drug can substantially increase
survival [54]. In February 2009, NICE recommended sunitinib as
ﬁst-line treatment for patients with advanced and/or metastatic
RCC who are suitable for immunotherapy and have an ECOG
performance status of 0 or 1 [55]. The previous draft of this
guidance acknowledged that sunitinib was a clinically effective
treatment but it was not considered a cost-effective use of health-
care resources based on the ICER threshold of UK£30K [55]. The
latest NICE appraisal of sunitinib took into account the new
evaluation criteria that factor in the added value society puts on
life-extending treatments at the end of life [55]. This could dem-
onstrate that a broad perspective, which goes beyond the appli-
cation of an ICER threshold, is used when evaluating drugs for
advanced cancer or simply that a higher ICER threshold may be
applied in this context.
The notion that there is no enforceable threshold—or that
any threshold is a ﬂexible range at best—is in accordance with
health economic theory [56]. Economic evaluations should be
only one piece of information in a reimbursement decision, and
whether a drug is “good value” depends on context. Canadian
leaders in reimbursement decisions centered on cost-effectiveness
have stated: “Anyone who has ever been involved in drug reim-
bursement decision-making knows that many factors in addition
to the cost-effectiveness ratio affect the ultimate decision [57].”
They cite other factors such as available resources, drugs for rare
diseases, drugs that increase survival, and the capacity for inap-
propriate utilization. A review of decisions in Australia found
that the likelihood of a positive reimbursement decisions was
inﬂuenced most strongly by use for a life-threatening condition—
it was even more important than certainty in the clinical beneﬁt,
cost to government, or ICER [58]. Most cancer drugs qualify in
this category.
Interestingly, sunitinib itself provides evidence that an ICER
alone is not a guide to a decision (Table 4). The ICER for second-
line MRCC use was the lowest at $56K/QALY [13], with $80K/
QALY for gastrointestinal stomal tumor (GIST) [59]. The CDR
rejected sunitinib for second-line use of MRCC but recom-
mended sunitinib with criteria for GIST. The data for ﬁrst-line
use were submitted to the newly formed central review agency,
the JODR, and despite the ICER of $144K/QALY, it achieved
nationwide funding [17]. Sorafenib was rejected by the CDR for
second-line MRCC use, with a Canadian ICER of $36K/LYG
(based on incremental lifetime costs of $43K and a survival
Table 4 ICER results versus reimbursement recommendation
Drug Indication ICER ($) Recommendation
Sorafenib Second-line MRCC 36K/LYG Do not list
Sunitinib Second-line MRCC 56K/QALY Do not list
Gastrointestinal stromal tumor 80K/QALY List (with criteria)
First-line MRCC 144K/QALY List (with criteria)
ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; LYG, life-year gained; MRCC, metastatic renal cell carcinoma; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
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advantage of 1.2 years) [26]. This demonstrates that the ICER
value alone does not predict a reimbursement decision.
The sunitinib subgroup analysis illustrates a second problem
with the ICER as a guide for oncology decision-making. As a ratio,
the ICER is dependent on the interaction between cost and beneﬁt.
When costs and beneﬁts do not increase proportionately, para-
doxical results can occur. Speciﬁcally, for an expensive drug in a
fatal disease, the best therapeutic successes are usually in patients
with good prognoses, resulting in long periods of drug treatment.
Nevertheless, these higher drug costs can get increasingly dispro-
portionate to the survival beneﬁt for patients with good prognos-
tic expectations. As a result, the ICER may be lowest in patients
who have a poor prognosis and little opportunity to experience a
survival beneﬁt: they do not stay on drug therapy, their costs
remain low, and the comparative treatment arm has very poor
survival. For sunitinib, the ICER was lowest (most attractive) in
patients with 3+ poor prognosis risk factors ($97K/QALY; results
not shown). Recommending coverage for sunitinib in patients
with the poorest prognosis may meet an ICER threshold of
$100K/QALY, butmakes no sense from a clinical perspective. This
would mean public funds were only made available for those who
beneﬁt less tomeet a threshold criterion—clearly counter-intuitive
to the goal of patients and clinicians.
The high ICER reported by this analysis was not an insur-
mountable barrier to access in this particular instance. Few
researchers seek to publish results with high ICERs, believing
they do not contribute positively to the reimbursement decision,
both locally and internationally [60]. Nevertheless, ICERs are
only one of many factors that affect an access decision. It is more
important to be transparent about the information that is avail-
able to the decision-maker, and conversely for the decision-maker
to be transparent about the rationale and the values underpin-
ning his/her choices. In the case of sunitinib, decision-makers
were receptive to a high cost drug with immature survival data
but substantial progression-free gains, for patients with a rare
cancer and few treatment options.
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